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INTRODUCTION: INTRA-DISCIPLINARY BARRIERS, EUROPE AND THE 
NEW REGIONALISM
The recent growth of interest in ‘new regionalism’ might have been considered likely to 
cause celebration in EU studies circles. Scholars in this field have often had to defend 
themselves against charges that their chosen area of study was either unnecessary 
(because the EU was stagnating), or was simply a whimsical off-shoot of more ‘serious’ 
work in international relations scholarship. Having had to justify their work or abandon 
it (as many of the pioneers in the field did during the mid 1970s to the mid 1980s, in the 
face of ‘Eurosclerosis’), it was sweet indeed for many in EU studies to have IR scholars 
return to the fray in the wake of the Single European Act. It was even sweeter to 
promptly inform them that their work was now out-dated because the European Union 
had become a polity in its own right, and was therefore more properly studied using the 
tools of comparative politics.  Thus, the advent of a whole new range of regional 
integration projects in the late 1980s should have been the ultimate reinforcement of EU 
studies, in that it indicated that regional integration was not after all limited to the 
European sub-continent, and that European Studies had a wider significance than many 
had dared hope.
Not a bit of it. With a few worthy exceptions, those involved in EU studies have 
barely made reference in their work to regional integration elsewhere1. ‘EU studies’ has 
become a sub-field of social science in its own right, where only the more adventurous 
or the most die-hard theorists use IR work as a frame for their studies. Moreover, those 
working in the ‘new regionalism’ (NR) field have tended to undertake their studies 
using international relations (IR) or international political economy (IPE) lenses, and 
have often either avoided focus on the EU or used somewhat outdated information on it 
as a result. Moreover, given the sensitivity in NR circles to the argument that the EU is 
not necessarily a model for other regional integration projects to follow, a tendency to 
downplay the importance of the Union for their subject - even as a source of 
comparative data -  has sometimes been apparent.
My aim in this paper is to try to address this problem of two sub-fields of 
political science ‘speaking past each other’. I take the issue of democratization as an 
example of where scholars of both the EU and NR could usefully learn from each other. 
I  argue that at both conceptual and empirical levels, new regionalist studies would 
benefit from the mainstreaming of democracy issues, in a similar way to that in which 
EU studies - ‘old regionalism’? - has recently benefited from a ‘normative turn’ that was 
partly facilitated by the intrusion of political theory into the IR/EU studies domain. I 
therefore seek to reinforce the work of certain NR scholars, who have begun to address 
the importance of studying civil society2. In terms of theory-building in NR studies, this 
step may require a broadening of the way in which ‘political’ appears to be understood 
by much of the established literature. In terms of empirical work, using democracy as a 
key variable is likely to help unpack the impact and extent of the various regional 
integration projects, and also to help explain why they are supported and criticised in 
1
 I would single out for mention here Ben Rosamond, William Wallace, Mario Telò, Kjell Eliassen and 
Walter Mattli.
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 See for instance Marchand, Bøås and Shaw 1999.
2different quarters. EU studies scholars, of course, would also benefit from richer sources 
of comparative data against which to test, model, refine or dispute their own findings.
In making this argument, I fully accept that NR scholarship usefully embraces 
several issues which have lately tended to stray outside the mainstream in EU studies, 
such as repeated exploration of the links between the regional, international and the 
local, critical engagement with international relations theories as a matter of course, and 
the clear use of international political economy literature. In the wake of the Treaty on 
European Union, many EU scholars have focused too narrowly on the development of 
the EU as a political system in its own right. 
This ‘comparative politics’ approach to the EU (Hix 1994, Hix 1998), while both 
careful not to sever links with international relations scholarship entirely and never 
espoused by all EU scholars, has produced much useful scholarship and pointed out the 
benefits of comparing EU policy-making processes to those of (Western) states in order 
better to understand them. However, by the same token, it has tended to focus on the 
state-like attributes of the EU, and thus to downplay the respects in which it remains 
more like an international organization - or other regional integration projects. At its 
best, such literature emphasises how the EU has become ‘a distinctive model of 
internationalization’ (Laffan 1998). At its worst, such literature serves to reinforce the 
separateness, or difference, of EU studies to the detriment of those seeking to improve 
EU theory or understand its mechanics.  Myopia such as this tends to keep EU studies in 
a theoretical silo, where the infamous ‘N=1’ problem3 restricts the improvement of the 
conceptual lenses that scholars use by shutting them off from wider debates in 
(international) political science (Rosamond 2000: 186-97). Thus, my argument should 
not be seen as a straightforward and fairly didactic reading-over from EU to NR studies. 
Rather, it is an attempt to show both EU and NR scholars the importance of 
mainstreaming democracy issues, and to advocate the utility of dialogue between 
scholars working in the two fields4.
The structure of my paper is as follows. First, I set out what I consider to be the 
primary benefits and problems of regularly using the EU as a comparator in NR studies, 
because those are the terms in which EU studies have primarily been brought into the 
‘new regionalism’ field. Second, I set out the reasons why democracy must be 
considered a ‘live issue’ by NR scholars. Third, I take as an example of what EU studies 
scholars might bring to new regionalism studies (or alternatively, as an example of what 
NR scholars could usefully integrate into their own work from EU studies) the literature 
on the EU’s ‘normative turn’, explaining the reasons for its advent and what it has done 
to change the nature of EU studies. Finally, I seek to set out an initial research agenda 
for democratization of regional integration which shows how scholars of NR and EU 
studies might fruitfully learn from each other. 
3
 The ‘N=1’ problem is long-standing in EU studies. It was in great part this notion - that the EU is so 
unique that meaningful comparisons cannot be drawn from the study of other contexts/systems - that 
caused the implosion of neofunctionalist regional integration theory in the 1970s.
4
 Having spent the last few years specializing in EU studies, it is apparent to me that many of the most 
renowned NR scholars would be familiar to those working in IR or IPE fields, but only a few  would be 
familiar to most of  those working in EU studies - a sad indictment of the condition of the latter.
3EUROPE5 AND THE NEW REGIONALISM: THE BENEFITS AND 
PROBLEMS OF COMPARISON
In order to establish the value and limits of Europe as a comparator for other instances 
of regional integration, it is necessary to address three issues. First, why should NR 
studies be comparative? Second, is Europe suitable as a comparator? Third, if Europe 
can be agreed to be suitable in this way, what are the advantages and disadvantages of 
this particular comparison - and, relatedly, do the former outweigh the latter? I address 
each of these issues in turn. Before so doing, it is worth reiterating that I consider 
comparative study of regional integration to bring significant benefits to EU studies 
scholars, and thus what follows should not be taken as an indicator that the systematic 
use of the European example in NR studies would be of utility to that field of study 
only.
The Uses of Comparison
There is general agreement in NR circles that comparative study is likely to be helpful. 
Although there are obvious differences between the various regional integration projects 
of the globe - of which the fact that some are heavily institutionalized, while others 
eschew formal institutions altogether is only the most obvious example - scholars tend 
to agree that these differences can be exaggerated, and that they certainly do not in 
themselves preclude comparative study (Eliassen and Børve Monsen 2001). Indeed, 
given that regional integration in its second wave seems to be a universal phenomenon, 
it is only by studying comparatively its various incarnations that we are likely to 
understand either it or its impact upon/causal links from the changing world order 
(Hettne 2001b).  Comparative study can help scholars understand the differences 
between different regional integration projects (Katzenstein 1996). Such work can thus 
enable scholars to see both how the various regional integration projects could usefully 
learn from each other, and also how the international political economy is impacting 
upon governance in different parts of the globe (an impact which may be universal but 
which is unlikely to be uniform). Thus, provided that comparative studies avoid giving 
one particular model of regional integration ideological pre-eminence, taking it as a 
norm which others must follow, they will tend to be extremely useful (Higgott 1998).
The EU as Comparator
Of course, with regard to the use of Europe/the EU as a comparator, there lies the rub. In 
‘first wave’ regional integration studies, it was often taken as read that what is now the 
EU was a teleological  model for either other regions or indeed the world (Haas 1961: 
366-9). In order to succeed, other regional integration projects would have to try to 
emulate the EU as much as possible;  that they did not do so could be taken as evidence 
of their likely failure. Even today, the fact that the EU is by far the most advanced 
instance of regional integration can incline scholars to the view that it is innately 
superior to other regional integration projects  - particularly by those who wish to see 
the EU become a federal United States of Europe. However, if the EU is to have any 
5
 I use ‘Europe’ here not as a synonym for the EU, but because regional integration in Europe involves 
many different overlapping institutions, of which the EU is merely the most powerful. I return to this 
point below.
4utility in NR studies, this triumphalism must be explicitly rejected (Hettne 2002; 
Breslin, Higgott and Rosamond 2002). The fact is that the EU has as often been 
explicitly refused as a model of regional integration as it has been seen as a source of 
good practice (Acharya 2002; Hettne 2002). Moreover, as even neofunctionalist EU 
scholars eventually admitted, taking the EU as the norm, or focusing on it exclusively, 
produces biased research and inadequate theory (Haas 1975), because it entices scholars 
to make unwarranted generalizations. Thus, neither EU nor NR scholars have anything 
to gain by taking Europe as the model of regional integration, rather than one among 
many.
If it can be agreed that the European case is not to be considered a prescriptive 
model, what value could its study add to the NR field? I argue that the benefits are 
considerable, and can be grouped into two kinds. First, what might be called study-
informing (or quasi-methodological) benefits. Second, what could be termed study-
shaping (or [meta]theoretical) benefits.
Study-informing  benefits
First, there is the fact that while it is not a model to be slavishly emulated, the EU’s 
greater historical experience with institutionalized regional integration may still be a 
source of learning. Not only is the EU capable of being an anti-model (as mentioned 
above), it is a laboratory6 in which those outside can see how actors relatively 
experienced in playing the regional game make mistakes, innovate, evolve, and address 
the legacies of past (in)action. This may well  have a sort of demonstration effect, 
whereby actors in other regions can take what they find useful from European 
experience, or whereby NR scholars can generate useful data. 
Second, there is the fact that even ‘new regionalism’ began in Europe, with the 
launching of the single market programme (Schulz, Söderbaum and Ojendal 2001; 
Hettne 2001a); thus, the European process can serve as a source of information about 
why ‘new regionalism’ was initiated, and how it differs from ‘old regionalism’7. 
A third such benefit from studying the European case is that it can indicate much 
about two particular defining characteristics of ‘new regionalism’, namely its multi-
dimensionality and reliance upon regional consciousness or identity (Hurrell 1995: 332). 
The links between politics and economics in European integration are perpetually 
controversial - witness the single currency project. For this very reason, the continuous 
re-visiting of the balance between economic and political integration in Europe, and the 
attempt to pass the latter off as the former, are indicative of the struggles to be expected 
in any advancing regional integration  project, highly institutionalized or not. The EU 
can thus serve to show both what can to happen in later stages of regional integration (a 
useful source of data for theorists) and what can be done about managing tensions 
between member states (a useful source of data for practitioners).
A fourth benefit is that using the European case as a comparator alerts scholars 
to the interplay between different regional bodies, institutions and processes. The EU is 
but one among several European bodies which govern the continent, and European 
states differ in their membership of the several bodies (e.g. European Convention on 
Human Rights, European Economic Area, Council of Europe). There is no uniform 
6
 The laboratory metaphor is borrowed from Nicolaïdis and Howse 2003.
7
 On the characteristics of ‘new regionalism’ see Hurrell 1995: 332.
5process of integration in Europe, and if the continent’s various experiences and 
experiments in regional integration are taken together they provide a whole range of 
potentially illuminating comparisons, both within the continent of Europe and between 
Europe and elsewhere. To raise two examples, might ASEAN be more fruitfully be 
compared with EFTA (the European Free Trade Area) than with the EU? Might there be 
interesting data generated from a comparative study of NATO (an organisation which 
allows the USA to dominate the security governance of the European continent)  and 
APEC (an organisation which allows the USA to extend its influence over the economic 
governance of the Asia-Pacific)? At the very least, using Europe as a comparator alerts 
the scholar of new regionalism to the fact that the various regional integration processes 
themselves, and not just regional integration per se, may be polycentric and internally 
variegated.
Study-shaping benefits
The first study-shaping benefit of using Europe as a comparator in NR studies is that it 
highlights the evolutionary nature of regional integration, and thus indicates that 
theorising in NR should be contingent, non-deterministic, and critical. Although Hettne 
(2002) is right to stress that there is no inherent teleology in regional integration - such 
projects can advance, deteriorate, advance again, fall apart etc -  that should not blind us 
to the fact that such evolution is possible. Moreover, such evolution is often as much a 
source of new questions as it is of solutions to old puzzles. This evolution tends to take 
place (in Europe, at least) at the expense of established ideas of what ‘deepening’ 
involves. Two particular issues are interesting here. First, the EU shows that as regional 
integration deepens it can often become less rather than more formal in nature. Thus, 
the increasingly complex business of policy-making in the EU relies on informal politics 
and alliance construction between actors in the various EU institutions and member 
states just as much as it does upon formal processes and procedures (Warleigh 2000, 
Warleigh 2001b). Second, approaches to policy making may change and multiply as 
regional integration deepens. Thus, the EU’s increasing use of soft law, flexibility (the 
idea that member states can opt out of common EU policy) and co-ordination rather than 
regulation may indicate that instances of advanced, institutionalised regional integration  
may have rather more in common with other (e.g. East Asian) models than is often 
thought.
Secondly, academic work in EU studies can serve as an example of  how 
important issues can be screened out by dominant theoretical frameworks which 
consider them insignificant. This problem has been present throughout the EU’s history, 
and should not be repeated in NR studies if at all possible. At a meta-theoretical level, it 
is important that NR studies broadens itself out to encompass not just IR and IPE but 
also comparative politics and political theory, so that it can address with sufficient depth 
and rigour the issues such as identity-formation and power transfer that it rightly 
identifies as crucial.
There are thus many benefits to be gained by using the European experience in 
comparative regional integration studies. In the next two sections of the paper, I attempt 
to make this general point more forcefully by looking at a particular issue, democracy, 
and how its delayed prominence in EU studies can be of use to NR. 
6WHY DEMOCRACY MATTERS TO NEW REGIONALISM - AND VICE 
VERSA
General Assumptions
The interplay between regional integration and democracy is usually underplayed. There 
is a general assumption that regional integration bolsters democracy by bringing states 
within the fold of liberal democracy, and makes states more legitimate by increasing the 
generation of public goods, thereby making those states seem worthwhile (Mattli 1999). 
Alternatively, regional integration can be seen as an attempt to reassert national 
traditions and policies at the regional level, because, in the face of globalization, 
national action is insufficient (Hettne 1993).  Although this is an advance on the 
treatment of democracy issues in the early literature on ‘old regionalism’, and many 
‘new regionalism’ scholars emphasise the importance of identity-building in the 
regionalization process, explicitly  integrating social constructivist ideas into their 
theoretical frameworks, it is rare outside the literature on the EU to find regional 
integration studies which focus on democracy as a key issue8. In what follows, I draw on 
insights generated by NR scholars as well as my own work on democracy beyond the 
nation state. 
Democratic Challenges for New Regionalism
Both conceptually and in terms of real-world politics regional integration can pose 
important challenges to democracy9. Regional integration alters the ways in which 
public policy is made, political structures are built and used, and individuals relate to 
both each other and the various political and economic orders in which they live. It takes 
place against the backdrop of a fundamental and ongoing recasting of the world order, in 
which state sovereignty is being recast and neoliberal economics are predominant 
(Hettne and Söderbaum 2000). Thus, it has huge implications for (national) identity and 
redistributive policy - one of the key components in generating loyalty to a given state. 
Regional integration can be a force for (liberal) democratization by imposing (or at least 
facilitating) new institutional structures on previously undemocratic states (Mansfield 
and Milner 1999); it can also free up spaces in which either new, more cosmopolitan 
senses of political identity can be expressed, or previously would-be totalising ‘national’ 
identities can be deconstructed. Regional integration can also of course be a force for 
making governance less democratic, inter alia by rendering governance structures and 
practices opaque, empowering a range of non-governmental actors, and making it more 
difficult for the citizen to play an active role in public life or hold those who really make 
policy at regional level accountable (Hettne 2000).
8
 For an exception, see the essays in Anderson 1999 and the work of Lähteenmäki-Smith (2000), who 
warns that the EU case shows other regional integration projects that regional integration can increase 
both the bureaucratization of politics and the marginalization of economically peripheral areas within the 
region.
9
 Democracy is perhaps best understood as the belief that those bound by a political system should have 
the means of control over it (either directly or via representatives), and that relations between those people 
should work on the basis of equality (Beetham 1994).
7As stated above, one track often followed by states involved in regional 
integration is to attempt the generation of legitimacy by arguing that regional integration 
allows the production of more, and better, public goods than would otherwise be 
possible. This somewhat economistic argument ignores two important issues. First, 
economists often argue that regional integration should be extended as much as possible 
if the ultimate welfare gains from it are to be enjoyed, thereby privileging public goods 
over what may be clear public preference (Mansfield and Milner 1999). In EU studies it 
has been demonstrated that reliance upon public goods production for legitimacy is 
mistaken; partly because there can be a significant gap between the public goods 
produced by the EU and those its citizens want from it, and partly because this approach 
tends to make citizens extremely utilitarian in their attitude to the EU. This leaves the 
EU open to significant disaffection because it has built up only very shallow and 
contingent stocks of legitimacy (Gabel 1998). 
In new regionalism, democracy is an important issue because one of NR’s chief 
characteristics is its high degree of voluntarism - participant states are not generally 
compelled to join because of hegemonic pressure or fear of military attack (Schulz, 
Söderbaum and Ojendal 2001). This fact gives regional organisations a stock of 
legitimacy on which to draw, but also implies that they must work democratically in 
order to avoid member state withdrawal or the alienation of member state publics. After 
all, states with the ability to choose to take part can also choose to withdraw; and 
societies which now have to consider nationals of other states when addressing issues of 
solidarity, identity and redistribution may find that their own preferences are only one, 
relatively small, part of the issues that policy makers from their own state must examine 
(Telò 2001)10.  The balance between domestic interest groups can be shifted; states can 
‘escape’ nationally restrictive links with powerful groups by acting at regional level. 
Alternatively, non-governmental groups (including players from outside the region 
itself) can be active shapers of regional integration, in the absence of popular 
understanding or domestic support (Mattli 1999: 49). 
A further issue for democracy posed by new regionalism is its impact on existing 
state structures. By this I mean not only the tendency to empower the executive over the 
legislature but also the lessening of pressures which maintain the unity of the state itself. 
Although perhaps most evident in the EU context, regional integration elsewhere also 
opens up space for subnational government to extend its range of activities, and also 
facilitates the creation of cross-border regions and growth poles which can detract, 
strictly speaking, from the sovereignty of the state (Schulz, Söderbaum and Ojendal 
2001). Of course, this may be no bad thing: what is important is to note its possibility, 
and the fact that it speaks to issues of identity, state power, intergovernmental relations 
within a state, and accountability.
Attention must be paid to the impact of regional integration on domestic policy 
preferences. This can be of enormous import, changing, or at least locking in, a different 
political system (a thin kind of liberal democracy) or an economic doctrine 
(neoliberalism) which is otherwise antithetical or at least new to the national tradition 
(Gamble 2001). A case in point is Mexico’s experience in NAFTA. Such changes are 
10
 Of course, the positive side of this, as Telò also notes, is that governments can find it correspondingly 
harder to articulate or enforce narrow or ethnocentric rules of citizenship or identity.
8not necessarily entirely bad from the point of view of development; what counts is the 
fact that regional integration is used to make, or cement, major systemic shifts which 
might not otherwise be supported. Furthermore, regional integration may require 
participant states to sacrifice, or at least downplay, long-standing relations with third 
countries which involve policies contrary to those of the regional group (for example 
personal freedom of movement between some of the 2004 entrant states to the EU and 
their neighbours). The impact on democracy is obvious. 
Thus, it is important to acknowledge that new regionalism and democracy are 
intricately linked. It is possible that they can reinforce each other. It is possible that 
regional integration can have a negative impact on democracy. It is also possible that 
democracy can have a negative impact on regional integration, at least as far as its most 
ardent supporters are concerned - witness the rise of ‘Euroscepticism’ in Europe, and the 
paralysing impact upon the EU of the ongoing crisis of the ‘democratic deficit’. As a 
direct result of its perceived illegitimacy, the EU has failed as a polity to develop 
significantly, devoting its attention to ensuring that the single currency was launched 
successfully and the mechanics of the enlargement process functioned smoothly. With 
this example of the importance of democracy in new regionalism in mind, I now focus 
on the ‘normative turn’ in EU studies that has arisen in order to develop ways of solving 
the EU’s democracy problem. 
USING THE EUROPEAN EXPERIENCE: THE ‘NORMATIVE TURN’ IN 
EUROPEAN STUDIES
Explaining the ‘Normative Turn’
In recent years, EU scholars have paid increasing attention to the issue of democracy, 
giving EU studies a ‘normative turn’ (Bellamy and Castiglione 2000). This has been for 
three primary reasons11. First, the Treaty on European Union (TEU) of 1992 raised 
again the idea of a possible federal outcome to the European integration process, a 
prospect against which many citizens rebelled. Ironically, many pro-integration citizens 
also began to doubt the quality of European integration, seeing in the TEU’s many 
concessions to national sovereignty the likelihood of institutional incapacity. Second, 
(European) integration theory has itself been going through a period of renewal, or at 
least re-examination. Traditional approaches (neofunctionalism; intergovernmentalism)  
are being re-evaluated and, in many cases, rejected. Thus, there was conceptual space 
for new issues to be mainstreamed into EU theory, which was being fundamentally re-
examined in order to restate its very objectives, focus and relations with other (sub) 
disciplines (Rosamond 2000). The third key factor is the entry into EU studies of 
scholars from other (sub) disciplines, who, alerted by the TEU to the fact that the 
European Union was a novel but highly developed political system, sought to elaborate 
ways in which its governance could be understood, developed and legitimised.
The product of this ‘turn’ has been a far more nuanced understanding of the 
ways in which regional integration - as exemplified by the EU - has an impact on 
democracy. It has also delivered an understanding of how EU governance might best be 
11
 On the context and contribution of the normative turn, see Warleigh 2003, especially chapter 1.
9democratized. This can be characterized as a quadruple balancing act (Warleigh 2004, 
forthcoming - on which the following paragraphs draw).
Four Balancing Acts: Complexities of Democracy in Regional Integration
As a transnational system, the EU is unlikely to be suited to the straightforward 
application of models based on the nation state, requiring instead innovations in the 
theory and practice of democratic governance (Schmitter 2000). Additionally, those 
seeking to reform the EU must recognise that it is deeply coloured by a path dependency 
which affects both the nature of the EU system and the attitudes of actors within it about 
the possibilities for reform (viz. the generally conservative and self-serving Commission 
White Paper on Governance of 2001). Attempting to make common policy in the 
absence of a hegemon, Union decision making has always been characterised by the 
search for consensus between key actors, defined as those in elites at national and EU 
levels12. Lord (1998: chs. 2 and 5) observes that this ‘extreme consensus democracy’ has 
been at the expense of mass democracy, which explains both how perceptions of a 
democratic deficit have arisen and why the EU’s legitimacy crisis of the last decade 
surprised many in positions of power. However, this culture of consensus usefully 
demonstrates that the EU must in fact balance both different kinds of legitimacy and the 
demands of different groups of actors in order to be democratic (Höreth 1999). Thus, 
although the equilibrium between these different sources and types of legitimacy is 
clearly in need of revision, it is necessary to acknowledge that the approach itself  - the 
instinct for balance - is both a reflection of the EU’s own political culture and likely to 
remain necessary. 
The first balancing act which the EU must perform is between different 
competing national views of what a democratic Union would constitute. The member 
states continue to want different things from European integration in terms of both 
specific policy areas and its ultimate end-point, the so-called finalité politique. 
Consequently they differ in the degree of sovereignty they are prepared to exercise 
jointly with their partner states, and also over the specific regime they would consider 
legitimate to erect at EU level. Member states may agree that a certain policy area 
should be EU competence, but differ enormously about both the nature of the legislation 
to be made and the constitution of the relevant decision rules. Furthermore, there are 
differences in political culture which often shape national elite responses to any given 
issue, as demonstrated most notoriously by the diametrically opposed German and 
British understandings of the term ‘federal’ (which Germans consider to mean a 
decentralised system based on strict separation of powers and strong rule of law, and the 
British consider to mean a centralised superstate). Moreover, national elite views about 
the desirable outcomes of the integration process change over time. For example, Italy 
under the present Berlusconi regime appears to be far less viscerally pro-integration than 
in the past. Thus, it is clear that this first balance must be constantly revisited, and that 
no particular view  has an inherently greater legitimacy than others: given that each state 
which joins the Union has formal equality with all other member states, there is no a 
priori reason why, for example, Danish reluctance to sign up to the Schengen 
12
 The composition of this elite has changed over time as the interinstitutional balance of power has 
altered. For an excellent guide to the history and development of the EU, see Dinan 1999. 
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agreements on freedom of movement13 is less legitimate than Belgian enthusiasm for 
them. 
The second balancing act is between the different levels of governance within 
the EU system. The Union has not replaced or superseded national systems, which 
continue to reflect different national balances between centre and periphery and various 
approaches to the welfare state; rather, the EU has ‘fused’ with them (Wessels 1997), 
leaving (sub)national governments to implement EU policy according to the dictates of 
national systems. In some member states, such as Germany, Austria, Belgium and 
Spain, regional/local government is powerful, bolstered by strong normative claims to 
legitimacy based on the principle of local self-government, often enshrined in national 
constitutions. As a complex and varied system of multi-level governance (Marks, 
Hooghe and Blank 1996), the EU needs to reflect the demands and roles of governance 
at local/regional, national and European levels if it is to be legitimate. Moreover, 
democratising the Union cannot be accomplished solely at EU level, but also requires 
change at (sub)national level, given that it is through actors and institutions at these 
levels that most citizens will experience the Union as a policy maker. 
The third balancing act is that between output legitimacy and input legitimacy. 
Traditionally, output legitimacy has been preferred, in the hope that loyalties would be 
transferred to the Union as a result of its production of public goods which were seen to 
increase the public welfare. As demonstrated by Bellamy and Warleigh (1998), this 
approach has been insufficient for two main reasons. First, the EU’s inability to develop 
the necessary redistributive policy, because the member states have refused to give it the 
necessary competence and budget (despite the growth in relative importance of EU 
cohesion policy). Second, the Union’s lack of attention to public participation, which 
has created, or at best done nothing to remove, a situation in which citizens are generally 
alienated from the integration process (Eurobarometer 54, Autumn 200014). Thus, 
democratisation will require a shift in favour of input legitimacy, which will not be easy 
in the absence of a Europeanised civil society (Warleigh 2001a). However, without the 
emergence of a self-conscious European demos, it is unlikely that institutional change at 
EU level will not be perceived as legitimate, but rather as the imposition of a false 
majoritarianism unrooted in (political) identity (Chryssochoou 2000).
The fourth, and final, balancing act is between different normative views of 
democracy. There are many different views about how exactly democracy is possible in 
the context of the EU, which may colour the different and changing national elite 
positions on the Union’s finalité politique as discussed above. However, this issue 
increasingly goes beyond national cleavages at the elite level to academic and popular 
debates on the best way to develop institutions such as EU citizenship, or the principles 
on which policy in newly-vigorous fields such as justice and home affairs or security 
and defence should be based. In terms of political theory, this boils down to debates 
over the most appropriate way to mix principles of cosmopolitanism and 
communitarianism, both of which are relevant to the Union given its multi-level and 
‘fused’ nature (Bellamy and Warleigh 1998).
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 Eurobarometer is a regular opinion poll using a sample of citizens from each member state, under the 
aegis of the European Commission. 
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The Need for Mutual Learning 
This work in EU studies can serve NR scholars ably. It demonstrates that 
democratization requires regional integration to be on a ‘more-than-a-market’ basis. It 
reinforces the constructivist approach in new regionalism. And it demonstrates the need 
for, and difficulty of, civil society regionalization. Although clearly it requires revision 
to suit each case of regional integration, given the varieties of  approaches taken to 
regional organization across the globe, the EU studies work on democratization does 
give a conceptual framework for the study of democratization processes in regional 
integration. It draws on, and adds to, political theories of democratic governance, and 
applies them to the specific case of regional integration. It thus offers variables to study 
and the beginnings of falsifiable hyopotheses which NR scholars could use. 
Such work also offers support to those in NR who are seeking to emphasise, or 
broaden, the attention given to the political aspects of regional integration (Mansfield 
and Milner 1999; Breslin, Higgott and Rosamond 2002; Marchand, Bøås and Shaw 
1999). Its contribution in this regard is all the more significant given that the 
development of a ‘regional society’ has been identified as the crucial stage in the 
development of regional integration projects (Hettne and Söderbaum 2000); a focus on 
democratization would help scholars identify just how far a given project has developed 
rule-based governance, civil society participation, and de facto multi-level governance 
practices (or structures).
However, this work on EU democratization also shows both the complexity of 
the task at hand, and the need to adopt an approach which is at least intra-disciplinary 
(i.e. drawing on several sub-fields of political science) and probably inter-disciplinary 
(drawing on social anthropology, sociology and psychology). At first blush, this is a 
great challenge to sub-fields in their infancy such as new regionalism and EU studies. 
However, viewed more creatively, it is also an opportunity to add important work to 
those (sub) disciplines, which often fail to integrate new political processes and 
structures into their own established canons - an opportunity that neither NR nor EU 
studies are, on their own, likely to grasp with success.
Democratization work in EU studies, then, also shows the need for that sub-
discipline to reach outside its boundaries. Not only would such work have been 
impossible in any other way, it is also unlikely to elaborate further without comparison 
and dialogue with those studying other regional integration projects, where many of the 
same dilemmas will arise, but where they may be more successfully addressed. Many 
working in EU studies could usefully imbibe the explicitly critical approach to regional 
integration adopted by NR scholars (Schulz, Söderbaum and Ojendal 2001: 6-7). They 
would also benefit from more structured use of the NR literature in order to question 
some of the emerging ideas in EU studies (such as the EU’s role as a ‘normative power’ 
[Manners 2002]), which tend to stress the EU’s role as a model rather than see it as one 
variant of regional integration among many.
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CONCLUSIONS: FOR A RAPPROCHEMENT BETWEEN EU AND NR 
STUDIES
In this paper I have tried to show that a rigid division between EU and NR studies is 
artificial and to the detriment of scholars in both fields. I have explored the justified 
concerns of NR scholars about intellectual imperialism on the part of those in EU 
studies, and argued that as both comparator and source of research-enriching ideas/data 
the EU can ably serve those working in the ‘new regionalism’. I have also argued that 
EU studies scholars would benefit from a deeper engagement with NR literature, in 
order to test their own assumptions, and discover ways in which the EU is, or is not, a 
source of generalizable strictures on regional integration. By taking the example of 
democratization, I have shown that EU scholars can be openly intra/inter-disciplinary, 
and also that this work has produced much that could be taken up usefully by NR 
scholars. I have not tried to argue that the two fields of study should be merged. 
Although greater dialogue between them may eventually lead to that outcome, it may 
also be that, for example, the EU’s state-like features necessitate an openness to state-
based comparative politics which NR scholars find unhelpful. 
Thus, a sensible way forward would be for EU and NR scholars to collaborate on 
the development of joint research agendas, where an explicitly international, critical and 
comparative focus seeks to question, test and develop insights developed by scholars in 
both fields. Democratization is a clear example of where such collaboration would be 
fruitful. It is no coincidence that the greater the number of  voices heard, the greater the 
likelihood of finding out the truth of who gets what, how, when and why - the old, and 
in my view still the best, way of defining why we study politics at all.
13
REFERENCES
Anderson, J (ed) (1999): Regional Integration and Democracy: Expanding on the European 
Experience. New York: Rowman and Littlefield.
Beetham, D (1994): ‘Key Principles and Indices for a Democratic Audit’, in D Beetham (ed) 
Defining and Measuring Democracy. London: Sage.
Bellamy, R and Castiglione, D (2000): The Normative Turn in European Union Studies: 
Legitimacy, Identity and Democracy. University of Exeter: RUSEL Working Paper 38.
Bellamy, R and Warleigh, A (1998): ‘From an Ethics of Integration to an Ethics of Participation: 
Citizenship and the Future of the European Union’, Millennium 27:3, 447-68.
Breslin, S; Higgott, R and Rosamond, B (2002): ‘Regions in Comparative Perspective’, in S 
Breslin, C W Hughes, N Philips and B Rosamond (eds) New Regionalisms in the Global 
Political Economy. London: Routledge. 
Chryssochoou, D (2000): Democracy in the European Union. London: IB Tauris.
Coleman, W D and Underhill, G R D (1998): ‘Introduction: Domestic Politics, Regional 
Economic Co-operation and Global Economic Integration’, in W D Coleman and G R D 
Underhill (eds) Regionalism and Global Economic Integration. London: Routledge.
Dinan, D (1999): Ever Closer Union (2nd ed). Basingstoke: Macmillan.
Eliassen, K and Børve Monsen, C (2001): ‘Comparison of European and Southeast Asian 
Integration’, in M Telò (ed) European Union and New Regionalism: Regional Actors 
and Global Governance in A Post-Hegemonic Era. Aldershot: Ashgate.
Gabel, M (1998): Interests and Integration: Market Liberalisation, Public Opinion and 
European Union. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Gamble, A (2001): ‘Regional Blocs, World Order and the New Mediaevalism’, in M Telò (ed) 
European Union and New Regionalism: Regional Actors and Global Governance in A 
Post-Hegemonic Era. Aldershot: Ashgate.
Höreth, M (1999): ‘No Way Out for the Beast? The Unsolved Legitimacy Problem of European 
Governance’, Journal of European Public Policy 6:2, 249-68.
Haas, E B (1961): ‘International Integration: The European and the Universal Process’, 
International Organization 15, 366-92.
Haas, E B (1975): The Obsolescence of Regional Integration Theory. Berkeley: University of 
California Press.
Hettne, B (1993): ‘Neo-Mercantilism: The Pursuit of Region-ness’, Co-operation and Conflict
28:3, 211-32.
Hettne, B (2000): ‘The New Regionalism: A Prologue’, in B Hettne, A Inotai and O Sunkel 
(eds) National Perspectives on the New Regionalism in the North. Basingstoke: 
Macmillan. 
Hettne, B (2001a): ‘Europe: Paradigm and Paradox’, in M Shulz, F Söderbaum and J Ojendal 
(eds) Regionalization in a  Globalizing World. London: Zed Books.
Hettne, B (2001b): ‘Regionalism, Security and Development: A Comparative Perspective’, in B 
Hettne, A Inotai and O Sunkel (eds) Comparing Regionalisms: Implications for 
Development. Basingstoke: Palgrave.
Hettne, B (2002): ‘The Europeanisation of Europe: Endogenous and Exogenous Dimensions’, 
Journal of European Integration 24:4, 325-40.
Hettne, B and Söderbaum, F (2000): ‘Theorising the Rise of Regionness’, New Political 
Economy 5:3, 457-73.
Higgott, R (1998): ‘The International Political Economy of Regionalism: The Asia-Pacific and 
Europe Compared’, in W D Coleman and G R D Underhill (eds) Regionalism and 
Global Economic Integration. London: Routledge.
14
Hix, S (1994): The Study of the European Community: The Challenge to Comparative Politics’, 
West European Politics 17:1, 1-30.
Hix, S (1998): ‘The Study of the European Union II: The “New Governance” Agenda and its 
Rival’, Journal of European Public Policy 5:1, 38-65.
Hurrell, A (1995): ‘Explaining the Resurgence of New regionalism in World Politics’, Review of 
International Studies 21, 331-58.
Katzenstein, P (1996): ‘Regionalism in Comparative Perspective’, Co-operation and Conflict
31:2, 123-59.
Laffan, B (1998): ‘The European Union: A Distinctive Model of Internationalization’, Journal 
of European Public Policy 5:2, 235-53.
Lord, C (1998): Democracy in the European Union. Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press.
Manners, I (2002): ‘Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?’, Journal of Common 
Market Studies 40:2, 235-58.
Mansfield, E D and Milner, H V (1999): ‘The New Wave of Regionalism’, International 
Organization 53:3, 589-627.
March, M.H. and Bøås, M and Shaw, T M (1999): ‘The Political Economy of New 
Regionalisms’, Third World Quarterly 20:5, 897-910.
Marks, G; Hooghe, L and Blank, K (1996): ‘European Integration From the 1980s: State-centric 
Versus Multi-level Governance, Journal of Common Market Studies 34:3, 341-78.
Mattli, W (1999): The Logic of Regional Integration: Europe and Beyond. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.
Nicolaïdis, K and Howse, R (2003): ‘ “This is My EUtopia”: Narrative as Power’, Journal of 
Common Market Studies 40:4, 767-92.
Rosamond, B (2000): Theories of European Integration. Basingstoke: Macmillan.
Schmitter, P (2000): How to Democratize the European Union...And Why Bother? New York: 
Rowman and Littlefield.
Shulz, M; Söderbaum, F and Ojendal, J (2001): ‘A Framework for Understanding 
Regionalization’, in M Shulz, F Söderbaum and J Ojendal (eds) Regionalization in a  
Globalizing World. London: Zed Books.
Telò, M (2001): ‘Introduction: Globalization, New Regionalism and the Role of the European 
Union’, in M Telò (ed) European Union and New Regionalism: Regional Actors and 
Global Governance in A Post-Hegemonic Era. Aldershot: Ashgate.
Warleigh, A (2000): ‘The Hustle: Citizenship Practice, NGOs and “Policy Coalitions” in the 
European Union’, Journal of European Public Policy 7:2, 229-43.
Warleigh, A (2001a): ‘Europeanizing Civil Scoiety: NGOs as Agents of Political Socialization’, 
Journal of Common Market Studies 39:4, 619-39.
Warleigh, A (2001b): ‘Introduction: Institutions, Institutionalism and Decision-making in the 
European Union’, in A Warleigh (ed) Understanding European Union Institutions. 
London: Routledge.
Warleigh, A (2003): Democracy in the European Union: Theory, Practice and Reform. London: 
Sage.
Warleigh, A (2004, forthcoming): ‘The European Union’, in P Burnell (ed) Democratization 
Through the Looking-Glass. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
Wessels, W (1997): ‘An Ever Closer Fusion? A Dynamic Macropolitical View on Integration 
Processes’, Journal of Common Market Studies 35:2, 267-99.
